I. Introduction
Since its inception in 1995, the U.S. Acid Rain Program (ARP) has earned widespread acclaim due to dramatic sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxides (NO X ) emission reductions, far-ranging environmental and human health benefits, and far lower-thanexpected compliance costs. By the end of 2006, regulated sources in the ARP had decreased annual SO 2 emissions by more than 40 percent and NO X emissions, in conjunction with other programs, by almost 50 percent. Notably, these reductions occurred while the combustion of fossils fuels for electricity generation, as measured by ''heat input,'' has increased by almost 40 percent ( Figure 1 ). major component of acid rain, declined by 25 to 40 percent from 1990 levels ( Figure 2 ). The reductions in wet sulfate deposition contributed to improvements in the ability of many lakes and streams, including very sensitive regions like the Adirondacks, to buffer acid deposition. These improvements are an important signal that recovery from decades of acid rain has begun.
The annual ecological and health benefits resulting from the ARP emission reductions are estimated at $142 billion by 2010 compared with annual compliance costs of $3.5 billion. 2, 3 The vast majority of these benefits come from the expected avoidance of nearly 19,000 premature deaths. 4 T he success and costeffectiveness of the ARP has led to greater interest in the use of cap-and-trade policies to control emissions. In the U.S., the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has established cap-andtrade programs for SO 2 , NO X , and mercury air emissions; the European Union has established a carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) cap-andtrade program; and other countries, including Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand, are considering the use of cap-andtrade to address their own environmental challenges.
EPA has accumulated over 20 years of experience designing, implementing, and assessing cap-and-trade programs. As governments and regional organizations design and implement new cap-and-trade programs, the lessons from the ARP -what worked well and what could have been done differentlycan provide valuable insights to policymakers and the public. This article identifies some of the key lessons that can be drawn from EPA's experience designing, operating, and assessing the ARP. Numerous outside observers have also critically assessed the ARP and provided valuable perspectives for consideration. 5 
II. Design of the Acid Rain Program
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments established the ARP-the world's first large-scale cap-and-trade program for air pollution. The program is designed to reduce electric power sector emissions of SO 2 and NO X through a national, market-based cap-and-trade system for SO 2 emissions, and a flexible, emissions-rate-based program for NO X emissions, with the goal of reducing the adverse effects of acid rain.
A. Sulfur dioxide program
In general terms, the ARP SO 2 program set a cap, or strict limit, on total SO 2 emissions from the electric power sector in the 48 contiguous states to achieve broad regional reductions of SO 2 and acid deposition. EPA issues allowances -authorizations to emit -equal to the cap and distributes them to regulated sources using defined formulas. EPA also auctions a small portion of the allowances (2.8 percent) each year. Regulated sources, including newly affected sources, other market participants, and the public, are free to bid on allowances at the auction, in addition to purchasing them any time through the active allowance market. R egulated sources must monitor, quality assure, and report to EPA hourly emissions of SO 2 , NO X , and CO 2 .
6 Because the cap ensures emissions will be at or below the specified level, EPA does not need to define how or where the electric power sector will make emission reductions; regulated sources are free to design and implement customized compliance strategies and to buy, sell, or save -''bank'' -allowances for optimum flexibility. Because allowances can be traded, regulated sources that can make low-cost reductions have an incentive to reduce more than required and sell surplus allowances to regulated sources with higher costs of control, thereby achieving the environmental goal at lower overall cost. 
B. Nitrogen oxides program
The ARP also requires NO X emission reductions from the vast majority of coal-fired electricity generating units in the contiguous 48 states. The NO X portion of the ARP sought to attain a 2 million ton annual NO X emission reduction from year 2000 projected emissions through a flexible rate-based regulatory program. Emission rates were established for specific boiler types, but electricity generating Because allowances can be traded, regulated sources that can make low-cost reductions have an incentive to reduce more than required and sell their surplus.
companies were offered the flexibility to comply with the applicable rate-based emission limit, expressed in pounds of NO X emissions per million British thermal units (Btu) of heat input, in one of three ways: (1) meet the standard annual emission-rate limitations at each combustion unit; (2) average emission rates at two or more units that share a common owner, which allows companies to focus controls at combustion units where it is technically easier and less expensive to control emissions; or (3) apply for a less stringent alternative emission limit (AEL) if the NO X emission control technology used to set the emission rate is installed and fails to achieve the required emissionrate limit. Emissions averaging has been a popular method of compliance, affording sources with more than one unit in the program the flexibility of operating at different emission levels to address different situations and still meet the requisite emission limit-the critical compliance element of the NO X program. If a regulated source or company exceeds the NO X emission-rate limit, each ton of excess emissions is subject to a penalty of $3, 
III. Lessons Learned from the Acid Rain Program
A. Good legislation makes program implementation easier by reducing uncertainty
The ARP benefited from good legislation. Environmental goals were set and established through a phased-in emission reduction approach. There were few legal challenges to the rules EPA issued and none delayed implementation of the cap-andtrade program. What little litigation did occur revolved around interpretations of statutory provisions that, in some instances, were overly complex or unclear.
In most cases the legislation provided clear, easy-to-understand, and easy-toimplement language. For instance, the allocations for the first phase of the SO 2 program were printed in the law, leaving no question about the approach or results. To ensure that the level of the cap was maintained through the allocation for the second phase, the legislation includes a ''ratchet'' provision that requires EPA to reduce each regulated source's allocation pro-rata if the various allocation formulas result in allocations greater than the cap. The law also made it clear that if the rules were delayed, every source would have to meet a source-specific emission limit without the flexibility of trading. This created the likelihood of very real costs associated with
The law made it clear that if the rules were delayed, every source would have to meet a source-specific emission limit without the flexibility of trading.
delaying the environmental improvement promised by the legislation. 9 
B. Adaptability to new circumstances is essential
An important element of the legislation or other legal authority is the ability to adapt to new information, practices, or technology. EPA has made a number of changes to the program foundation since 1990. Most of the changes were intended to streamline the program; improve the quality of emission data; take advantage of advances in information technology and the Internet; minimize burden and costs for regulated sources, market participants, and EPA; and improve the environmental accountability and results of the program.
C. Flexibility streamlines decision-making and reduces costs
A key feature of the ARP is the different roles that EPA and regulated sources play compared to traditional command and control approaches. In the ARP the regulated source, which best understands its operation and business, has the flexibility to develop compliance strategies and make decisions on technologies, fuels, operational practices, and investments, and to change its approach as better methods become available, without needing government review and approval. The government is focused on setting the environmental goal. EPA collects and verifies emission data, tracks allowance transactions, assesses and enforces compliance, and publishes information about the program.
T his flexibility to develop compliance strategies creates a continuous opportunity for regulated sources to seek customized, cost-effective approaches to control emissions. Emission sources are not forced to install technology that may not be appropriate for their configuration or business plan and the compliance strategies are not subject to complex review by EPA to determine if the decisions meet technical specifications or if pollution control equipment is operating properly. Because EPA does not review the compliance strategies, there is no uncertainty about regulatory approval. 10 The stringency and simplicity of the emission cap ensure that the environmental benefits will be achieved regardless of individual compliance strategies. The result is that built-in flexibility not only keeps costs low for sources that choose cost-effective compliance strategies, but it also minimizes the administrative costs of the program.
As part of its compliance strategy a regulated source may engage in allowance tradingbuying or selling surplus allowances. Because of the cap, there is no need for EPA to review each transaction thereby reducing the time, transaction costs, and administrative costs to trade allowances. Parties to a trade can enter the transactions online using EPA's information system, allowing trades to be processed in less than one day; competition and market liquidity have driven down the costs of private transactions to less than 0.1 percent of the cost of an allowance, 11,12 and administering transactions of millions of allowances each year requires less than one full-time employee at EPA. F lexibility has driven down the cost of reducing emissions by offering a wide range of emission control options and encouraging innovation. Competition among railroads shipping low-sulfur coal led to significant reductions in transport costs, a major component of coal cost; boiler adaptations and flexibility in the operation of flue gas desulfurization equipment (i.e., scrubbers) coupled with design and equipment advances increased the removal effectiveness from 90 to 95 and, more recently, 98 percent, and Flexibility has driven down the cost of reducing emissions by offering a wide range of emission control options and encouraging innovation.
reduced the capital costs of the equipment by approximately 50 percent. 13 The effort to find ever cheaper emission reduction options also led to experimentation that improved the understanding and widespread use of fuel blending that reduced the cost of avoiding emissions. 14, 15 Innovations in the fuels market also led to lower compliance costs as western producers of low-sulfur coal made major productivity gains to make their coal competitive in midwestern and eastern markets.
In some cases, suppliers of relatively higher-sulfur coal started bundling allowances with coal to compensate buyers for the higher emissions and improve the competitiveness of their product. Bundling allowances not only made high-sulfur coal more attractive to fuel purchasers, but it enabled arbitrage between the fuels and allowance markets.
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Other emission reduction options that competed to lower costs included installing or improving pollution controls, improving operating and/or combustion efficiencies, switching to cleaner fuels and/or cleaner combustion units, retiring or closing uneconomic facilities, and/or purchasing allowances from the allowance market. For many companies, these actions were combined across their fleet of fossil fuel units to meet load requirements and comply with the ARP in the most cost-effective manner.
The ARP also provides emission sources with temporal flexibility through banking, providing an incentive for sources to decrease emissions below allowable levels sooner than required, resulting in earlier human health and environmental benefits. Banking provides liquidity, a cushion for price volatility, and creates a safety mechanism for unforeseen market events. With the bank, allowances could go up in any given year (and have, in some cases) although the overall trend shows significant power industry reductions of SO 2 . Over the five years of Phase I, regulated sources reduced emissions 11.62 million tons more than required and could use those banked allowances to cushion the effect of the declining cap in the second phase.
F lexibility under the ARP has not adversely affected attainment of national ambient air quality standards. Independent analyses of the ARP demonstrate that trading has not led to increases in localized pollution, or ''hotspots.'' 17, 18 In fact, the greatest SO 2 emission reductions were achieved in the regions that had the highest SO 2 emissions prior to the program (Figure 3) , acid deposition decreased (Figure 1 ), and environmental benefits were delivered in the areas where they were most critically needed.
D. Accountability is the prerequisite for flexibility
Cap-and-trade programs require rigorous and complete emissions data. EPA believes the emission data underlying the ARP, including SO 2 , NO X , and CO 2 emissions, is the most accurate and comprehensive emission data collected by EPA or any other government agency. To determine that regulated sources are in compliance, EPA requires monitoring, reporting, and verification of emissions to ensure that emissions data are complete, consistent, and account for every ton. The quality of emission monitoring plays an important role in determining the market efficiency, investor confidence, and ability to meet the emission reduction target. 19 R egulated sources are required to measure and report hourly emission data with monitoring techniques that range from the more stringent continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS) and fuel-based analysis to the more flexible emission estimation methods, which are based on testing samples of flue gas from the stack. Coal-fired units are required to use CEMS for SO 2 emissions, while units that burn oil, gas, or other homogenous fuels have the flexibility to choose CEMS or fuel analysis methods for SO 2 and CO 2 . Given the unpredictability of combustion NO X emissions, most sources are required to measure NO X with CEMS.
The more flexible measurement methods use environmentally conservative assumptions that overestimate actual emissions. This overestimation reflects any uncertainty in the methodology. Because the overestimated emissions must be offset with allowances, there is an incentive for regulated sources to use more accurate monitoring approaches. More importantly, more accurate monitoring approaches are focused where it matters most: on the largest emitters.
Emissions data are subjected to extensive, rigorous quality assurance (QA) checks by the regulated sources and EPA to ensure completeness and accuracy. Sources implement a mandatory and comprehensive on-site QA program where monitoring systems are subjected to daily calibration and a series of checks and tests, before certification and submission of their quarterly electronic data reports to EPA. EPA audits the reported data through a several-step process, 20 and then supplements this audit process with separate ad hoc analyses and data cleanup surveys. The highquality emission data provide the basis for ensuring compliance and assessing achievement of the emission reduction goal and contribute to the credibility of the allowance market.
E. Complexity and ambiguity increase costs and create uncertainty
The ARP has demonstrated that operating the program with simple, clear goals and rules saves time and money for both regulated sources and EPA. Moreover, the high compliance rate with the critical elements of the SO 2 and NO X programsgreater than 99 percent -is due in large part to rules that are clear and easily enforced. In contrast, complexity often requires more decisions, debate, and information collection. Such a situation can create uncertainty and unnecessary burden that may lead to delays, opportunities foregone, and, ultimately, higher costs.
While simplicity was a key objective of the ARP, some areas of the program included unnecessary complexity. Some of these complexities were introduced in the political process as a way to gain support for the program. Two aspects of the program -allocation formulas and partial coverage of the electricity sector during Phase Ihad the potential to increase uncertainty, program costs, and administrative burden, and may have benefited from greater simplicity.
A llowance distribution can be one of the most challenging aspects of developing a cap-and-trade program. The particular method for distributing allowances is generally not critical to the environmental success or total cost of the program, but can affect the distribution of economic impacts. Unlike ARP Phase I allocations which were specified in the legislation, Phase II allocations were more complicated, with a number of different formulas. The complications of the allocation process led to litigation as regulated sources sought to force the EPA to use interpretations of the statute that would result in more allowances for the source. A simpler allocation process that minimized the number of formulas and established clearly defined data requirements may have enhanced certainty, lowered the administrative burden, and reduced or eliminated the litigation over allocations.
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ecause Phase I of the ARP covered only a subset of electricity generating units, there was a possibility of ''leakage''-shifting generation from a Phase I source to a source not required to participate in the ARP until Phase II. The electric power sector is interconnected, meaning sources could easily shift generation from one combustion unit to another. To address the possibility of leakage, the ARP includes a reduced utilization provision that requires a Phase I source that reduces utilization to demonstrate that the reduction was not offset by an increase at a non-Phase I source. Through this provision and the voluntary substitution provision several hundred more units, including some oil and gas units, were brought into Phase I. If the ARP had included all regulated sources in Phase I, there would have been no possibility of leakage and the complicated reduced utilization provision would not have been necessary.
F. Incentives need to be clear and strong to be effective
By their very nature, marketbased programs provide incentives to seek opportunities to reduce compliance costs. While the ARP includes a number of incentive provisions to promote compliance or encourage certain activities, some were insufficient to achieve their objective.
The penalty provisions for noncompliance reduce the need for traditional enforcement mechanisms and the courts, which could delay end-of-year compliance assessments, introduce market and environmental uncertainty, and increase costs. Excess emissions trigger clear, nonnegotiable, automatic penalties -allowances equal to the excess emissions are automatically deducted from the facility's account and a significant financial penalty is automatically due and payable. Other violations as well as excess emissions may result in supplemental civil and/ or criminal penalties. Compliance is encouraged through the use of incentives, including progressively punitive provisions for missing monitoring data, reduced frequency for monitoring equipment quality assurance checks when superior test results are achieved, and clear consequences for cases of excess emissions.
T he ARP also includes provisions to promote energy and resource efficiency. For example, the Conservation and Renewable Energy Reserve was created to provide allowances to energy efficiency and renewable energy projects. The program's features included a standard award formula, a preapproved list of eligibility measures, and standardized measurement protocols. 21 However, it also required detailed information to verify the measures used to avoid emissions and to calculate the tons of emissions avoided. Ultimately the conservative award formula and low allowances prices provided an inadequate incentive to spur additional projects.
G. Information technology streamlines program operation and reduces administrative costs
For the ARP to operate with environmental integrity and public credibility, the EPA must collect, verify, maintain, and disseminate vast amounts of data. The most effective method available today to process and disseminate these data is an integrated information system. The advantages of using information systems go well beyond their ability to handle large amounts of data. Information systems provide increased data accuracy, reduced administrative time and cost, enhanced access, greater transparency, and improved consistency and comparability.
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T he information system is a critical component of the ARP infrastructure. Without the systems in place to collect, process, maintain, and disseminate emission and allowance data, the program would require significantly greater resources and would not likely achieve the same level of accuracy or consistency. Due in part to the simplicity and clarity of the rules, EPA is able to take full advantage of information systems to operate the entire program with fewer than 50 EPA employees. Most of these staff are responsible for certifying and auditing monitoring equipment and data and providing compliance support to the regulated community. 23 The process of allowance transfers requires minimal EPA staff input with 98 percent of the transactions done online by market participants.
H. The government's role should be focused on ensuring the program achieves the environmental goal
One of the aims of the ARP was not only to achieve significant environmental outcomes and to do it at lower cost, but to change the way government and industry interact. As noted previously, the nature of a well-designed cap-and-trade program allows EPA to focus on results.
The EPA facilitates compliance by assisting regulated sources. This includes holding workshops on the technical aspects of the ARP, including monitoring and reporting requirements, and working with sources one-on-one to help them understand the program's requirements and to assist with issues that could lead to non-compliance. EPA has staff dedicated to compliance support in specific regions of the country. These staff are available to answer questions about monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements. Because the goal of the program is complete compliance, EPA works with regulated sources to ensure they are complying with the provisions and requirements of the ARP.
I. Cap-and-trade policies complement programs intended to protect local air quality Cap-and-trade programs work best on a regional or larger scale. By requiring significant reductions of regional pollution that is often transported across state boundaries, cap-and-trade programs may also, and often do, improve local air quality. However, eliminating high, localized concentrations of emissions is not their primary purpose. To protect local air quality, cap-and-trade programs should complement, not conflict with, state or local programs.
In the case of the ARP, regulated sources must comply with all applicable local, state, and other federal emission requirements, regardless of the number of allowances held. This means that local and state governments can impose additional source-specific emission limits as necessary to protect local air quality. ARP, recent scientific research shows the need for additional SO 2 and NO X reductions to fully restore our environment, and further reduce the number of acidic lakes and streams in many regions of the country. 24 Some of these additional emission reductions will be achieved through implementation of regulations to address transport of ozone and fine particles, including CAIR; car and diesel rules affecting mobile sources; and state implementation plans to achieve National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
J. Transparency builds confidence and credibility

IV. Conclusions
The lessons from the ARP provide insight into how to effectively design and operate cap-and-trade programs. Key lessons from EPA's experience can help policymakers in the U.S. and abroad as they consider the implementation of cap-and-trade programs. The key lessons from the ARP are:
Clear, comprehensive legislation makes it easier to implement the program and minimizes legal challenges that can introduce uncertainty, delays, and additional costs;
A solid, but adaptable, program foundation is a substantial benefit, allowing room for new information, practices, and technologies; Flexibility in compliance approaches streamlines the decision-making process, fosters innovation, opens new compliance alternatives, and creates competition among emission reduction options, thereby reducing compliance costs-and lower costs make it possible to seek greater environmental protections where necessary;
Accountability is a prerequisite for flexibility-regulated sources must be held accountable for accurately measuring and reporting all emissions, and complying with program requirements; Clear, simple rules are easier and less costly to implement; complexity may be required in some cases, but should be minimized whenever possible;
Clear and strong incentives can encourage better monitoring and improve compliance with allowance holding requirements;
Special provisions should be used sparingly and care should be taken to create sufficient incentive to achieve the objective; Information technology makes it possible to collect, quality assure, maintain, and disseminate large amounts of data and information with very low administrative expenses and burden;
Regulators can create a cooperative relationship with industry by focusing on results and assisting regulated sources in complying with program requirements;
Cap-and-trade programs can provide cost-effective, broad, regional reductions of air pollution and should complement efforts to attain and maintain local air quality;
Transparency of data and program operation provide an additional level of scrutiny to verify enforcement and encourage compliance, and inform stakeholders, including the public, about the program and its results; and Assessment is an important tool to measure progress toward the goal of the program.
With more than 15 years of experience, the Acid Rain Program clearly demonstrates that market-based cap-and-trade programs are an effective means of achieving broad improvements in air quality by reducing emissions of regionally transported air pollutants and encouraging efficient solutions. For regional or larger-scale air pollution problems, experience suggests that a well-designed cap-and-trade program can be cost-effective, flexible, and easy to implement, with clear benefits sustainable into the future.&
